tv Tonight From Washington CSPAN February 12, 2010 8:00pm-11:00pm EST
that's the beauty of a representative government. as with more and more members of the house should be doing with the time that they are spending in their districts, especially during the presidents' day work. >> host: were at a time. we thank you so much for being with us as your back you districts during this presidents' day. we'll see when you get back in d.c. and thank you for being with us for the last 45 minutes and talking with our viewers. >> guest: thank you. thank you, suzanne. ..
called former president nelson mandela to congratulate him on the 20th anniversary of his release from prison. president obama expressed the american people's great admiration for president mandela and he was appreciative of the call. next up to a quick week ahead. on sunday i don't have anything for tomorrow. the president will travel to
camp david and return to the white house on monday -- >> i don't believe -- let me get that for you >> [inaudible] >> i will require that will we be. tuesday the president will visit and were the jobs training center in the capitol region. wednesday the president will meet with the king of spain at the white house. on thursday the president as we talk about yesterday will meet with the dalai lama here. he will then travel to denver colorado where he will deliver remarks at an even tougher senter bennet, and then traveled to las vegas, nevada. on friday the president will hold evens with senator reid in las vegas to include discussions with citizens and business leaders about working together to address the economic challenges facing nevada and the rest of america.
the president will return that afternoon to washington dc. i will find out your full-time for sunday. >> robert, are those reid defense fund raisers? >> i don't know that -- >> the campaign evens? >> i do not believe any of those events were fund raisers put me double check on that. >> no evin from monday? >> know he's got nothing monday. >> signing the debt limit? >> i don't -- it could be this weekend but i don't have the date yet. >> thanks, robert. i wanted to ask a little bit about the jobs bill in the senate. does the president supports what happened with senator reid drafting this bipartisan bill and offering a pair back space loan. what is his stance on that? >> guest: let's understand a couple of different things. one, i don't think there will be
-- i don't think there will be only one piece of legislation that will encompass all of the ideas members in the senate or even the president have for strengthening the economy and creating a better environment for hiring. but will probably take many forms. we never thought it would go through one package. senator reid's legislation i wouldn't corridors as a democratic plan since the hiring tax credit is as you know schumer-hatch -- designed by some measures schumer and hatch. it has small business expense reauthorization of the high -- hi windel and built america extant in bonds. again, i think this is just one of many vehicles that will likely go through this and
senate during the process. there's a number of ideas that will garner bipartisan support that are in the initial piece of cement legislation. unemployment insurance extensions, period brough all extensions for the unemployed and extension of the sba lending program. there are a host of things that can garner support in the vehicle but senator reid is moving when the senate gets back and will move for what this process. >> does the white house support the vehicle as it stands right now? >> i think the jobs tax credit is akin to what the president has had in mind and i think the infrastructure investment is something he has talked about.
the expense provisions all of which the president would be here to sign. >> what about the latest that has happened yesterday? the was a statement released by you about the president's support of bipartisan senate bill and then by the day's end it wasn't bipartisan. were you surprised? >> let's be clear idea of the legislation senator reid will move when the senate comes back into town will garner bipartisan support. i think there are things that democrats and republicans alike agree need to be in the mix some of which we just went over that will also garner bipartisan support. i don't -- i don't think that again there will gist the one vehicle to be moved, and i don't think there is only one chance of getting by partisanship. i think there are a series of ideas that all a fuss agree need to be put forward to stabilize
our economy. >> to finish that thought understanding this might garner bipartisan support this way it happened yesterday that the white house see this coming? >> i will know the degree to which senator reid made reports but we went to congress, i don't know the degree to which he talked to us about that. >> speaking of bipartisanship, are you encouraged by what appears to be growing sides of bipartisanship on the financial regulation in congress? are due encouraged that one, a bill could be finished by the summer? and number two, do you have any sense or is the white house willing to compromise at all on what appears to be the biggest sticking point of the consumer financial protection agency? >> i think there are, jeff, strong signals on a number of fronts that working together has its advantages whether it is on
financial regulatory reform, which obviously the president believes is a big priority this year. look, one of the big points that was discussed and what the bipartisan meeting on tuesday was with senator mcconnell but moving nominees. i recounted the story couple times yesterday with 63 being held for more than a month, ten times the number that had been held more than a month at this point in president bush's up fenestration and -- had administration. it passed by 36% less land. i think what is regulatory reform, provisions to help small businesses, whether it is moving qualified nominees forward, i think we can see this week the benefits of working together. in terms of the consumer office
i think the president still believes it is a great priority to have the independent authority to ensure consumers in this reform are protected from the type of loans that we've seen happen that have led to massive foreclosures, the type of tricks with credit cards we have seen in the past that the legislation and congress approved is intended to deal with. the president continues to be a very strong support of that function of the reform bill we sent to congress. >> as the agency have to be a separate entity? is that something he would be willing to compromise on? >> item from the nature of the proposals are. i think this is something that would need to have independent
authority and that is what is important -- this is what consumers want, important for their protection. >> does that indicate that maybe there is wiggle room as long as an independent authority is preserved? >> i think what the president greatly resists is the notion that somehow this is the protection of consumers is unattainable and financial reform -- >> that's not the question though. >> what i'm saying is without knowing what exact vehicle might come in a bipartisan proposal from the senate obviously we would look at this assuming that strong consumer protections and authority was in that legislation by don't want to get ahead of -- i don't want to get ahead of with that proposal might look might look like. >> last month i asked you if the
president had an opinion on some of the discussions and changing the senate rules so that the republicans or the minority in the future wouldn't be able to demand the cloture by 60 votes as often he said he would check with affairs. my understanding is one of the president's close allies in the senate, durbin, they are starting to support behind the bill from tom harkin and the would introduce a sliding scale so the 60 vote thing wouldn't be required as often. have you guys disgusted with senator durbin? >> let me check again on whether we have had conversations with senator durbin. there's been great frustration on either side either on this side or on capitol hill on the sheer amount of times in which cloture is needed to be invoked. we've discussed the frustrations
of particularly as it relates to noncontroversial legislation and noncontroversial nominee is. we went to -- you heard the president discussed the gsa director that had been stalled, had to seek closure, it wasn't a close vote and was approved 96 to nothing and i think at that point we realized that this is a rule that is being abused. i will check with whether any conversation has been had with senator durbin about senator harkin's legislation. >> to follow-up on the bipartisan jobs bill that senator schumer and hatch and bachus have been working on. the reason those given by my understanding of the majority leader read for scrapping that effort to much of the dismay of the senators who have been working on it is that there were protests from some of the more liberal or progressive members of the caucus on the samet.
isn't this kind of bipartisan move that those four senators, bipartisan senators had been working on exactly what the president has been talking about it isn't harry reid's move to scrap it regardless of what comes out of the senate eventually? is in that country rich with the president has been talking about? >> again -- >> you guys put your support behind the bipartisan effort. >> we support working in the way to get these things done. whether the vehicle those, jake, whether the vehicle is the four items that senator reid has now, whether that includes on employment cobra extensions and whether that includes extension for the sba lending or tax extenders, whether it includes disaster relief, those are discussions they will have. again, i believe that many of
these will be implemented and voted on and approved with strong bipartisan majorities. >> but you guys obviously lead your support to the bipartisan, the four senators of them working hard on this bipartisan effort and senator reid because of concerns from morrill lacrosse scrap its, that have been disappointing to the president in his calls the -- >> i do not think that taking first of all the main part of the piece of legislation senator reid will have the senate vote on is the schumer-hatch jobs tax credit, so what legislative vehicle many of these bipartisan
ideas, what ever it moves on, they're in some ways not quite as important as demonstrating that we can work together, it is putting the centerpiece of a bill that is going to move when the senate comes back from recess. the jobs tax credit i think since the appropriate message to small businesses on the country that washington can work together to create an environment that incentivizes the additional hiring of workers and small businesses. that is what the president has talked about. >> to paraphrase by partisanship can't just be adopting one person set of ideas. i understand that hatch and schumer were working on the tax credit to get there without was something the was the president's proposal, it was a democratic idea ultimately to lead the president --
>> at fifa hiring tax credit is a proposal the president offered, i'm not sure you would consider senator hatch to be somehow overly sympathetic to the white house view on these issues. i think it demonstrates -- mine essey way of saying i think if you look at both what is in this legislation, and i think if you look at what isn't in this legislation that will ultimately move i can't imagine a scenario in which extending unemployment benefits for those out of work and having those benefits expire isn't going to garner bipartisan support. extending -- bernanke jobs version when the president was asked about when he was here asked about mitch mcconnell talking about how they can support, republicans can support
nuclear energy and the president's response was, i'm paraphrasing but of course they like those are republican ideas offering in the name of bipartisanship and what's going on here is the reverse, harry reid taking out the one democratic idea. >> do you think helping small businesses grow by allowing them to write off their expenditures is going to -- something that is a democratic idea? you think that the highway trust fund extension is a uniquely space space idea? if you were to break the components of that bill individually each of those would donner strong bipartisan support. so,, i think we are in some ways over reading some of this because again, i think personally i believe that the components of this bill, several
components that were in the bipartisan bill but are not in the reid bill will still be bipartisan. i think -- i don't think any of the ideas the life list here today are uniquely space ideas that have dispensed with republican ideas. i will come back. >> robert could you set us straight on the president's role in deciding whether the trial of khalid sheikh mohammed will be? >> obviously the decision was made appropriately in conjunction with an interagency process by the attorney general. but obviously there are efforts on capitol hill through legislation to restrict either the type of for the venue the trial for khalid sheikh mohammed and his co-conspirators. that by definition involves the white house and ultimately the president.
so, since this effort has moved from a strictly justice department decision to something that's in the legislative arena the white house and by definition the president are involved. >> he is actually the person saying -- >> he isn't in the room with a big map piquing the location. obviously the president and the members of the white house staff have an equity given what is going on in the capitol hill legislation. yes, sir. >> following up on that though i want to read your note first. is it valentine's? does it have snoopy? >> i was wrong earlier. if you want to let folks know just got word that the debt limit paygo will be signed later today. >> behind closed doors? >> not on my notes. >> go ahead.
>> following up on the khalid sheikh mohammed question, sunday when katie couric asked the president have you ruled out trying khalid sheikh mohammed in new york city he said all i have not ruled out. wasn't he saying by saying i have not ruled out that he is essentially the decision maker on this? >> i think obviously he's the commander-in-chief. obviously he said he hadn't ruled out, that we would take into account the security and logistical concerns that have been brought forth by new york city, and those will be as he said taken into account before the final decision is made. >> as he strongly implied here it will be by him? >> i think he will have strong
equities in this decision and will hear from a lot of different people. spec when will the decision come down? >> i don't know. i know that it was brought up in a meeting i was an earlier today, but it wasn't a decision making meeting. >> use said he will be hearing from a lot of people, the input is for him making a decision. >> i think that he will hear from a lot of people, he will be involved in a larger process. >> says he's much more deeply involved than he was -- >> again because congress has become involved in this, because legislation could restrict the venue and the type of the trial, the white house is more involved. sprint does the president think there was a political year term try him in new york in the first place since it looks like it is a different direction? >> i will remind you that some of the people that you hear now
that are opposed to the trial of new york were in november supportive of the trial. again we are going to take into account security and logistical concerns that those individuals now have the cost of the trial of the ausley is one thing, and all of that will be taken into account. >> if i could follow on the line of questioning here i think your answer is basically that in the end most of the stuff will be taken out on a bipartisan basis but isn't a bipartisan should also about tone and by doing what harry reid did yesterday you had four members working together, people were looking around saying what is wrong we have people working together on a bipartisan basis and then we realized what was wrong? harry reid was about to slap them in the face or pull the rug out from under this effort. >> with its -- no, i think
that's an over reading of the situation. the centerpiece for the job creation in the bipartisan legislation was the schumer-hatch small-business hiring tax cut. that is now the hallmark of the legislation that will move in the samet. here's what i think is most important, is are we going to get these individual items and items that are not in this legislation passed to benefit the american people and are we going to get them passed in a bipartisan way? i think the answer in both of those questions is yes. some of that matters as they pass a bipartisan votes and not what people are actually working together? >> no because i think that you are going to have bipartisan votes because they are working together on ideas that appeal to both democrats and republicans. the president's example -- the
presidents example jake brought up the other day is when you have an ideal that appeals to one party on this side were just appeals to the party on the other side, tax cuts and courage and equipment investment isn't a partisan idea. reauthorize and extending the highway bill for a year always gets strong bipartisan support. built america bonds will have bipartisan support. the hiring tax credit written by the democratic senator and republican senator by definition will have bipartisan support. what is not in that bill extending tax cuts likely have bipartisan support including something like the research and development tax credit which is extended year after year. extending unemployment compensation and health care for the unemployed will garner bipartisan support because it is not a partisan idea.
extending lending programs -- >> does the white house supports the tactic? >> i think that you are greatly over reading and oversimplifying what's going on. >> i think it was a hardball political attacked. >> i just don't see it. sprick attorney general holder's comments of the end of the day where the case was tried and whatever forum we have to insure a dustin as transparently as possible, is that a softening of the administration position about holding the trial in the article 3 courts? >> the question that was posed to him asks if the fair trials can be held in military conditions, and i can give you a transcript -- >> we shouldn't read it as a new openness to the military? >> understanding this, that the military commissions had traditionally been something that had faced through the
supreme court constitutional problems until this administration working on a bipartisan basis with capitol hill reform the process. >> do you feel the board as the administration feel that they are inferior to the article 3 courts? >> no, and i think the way that -- the reform efforts that have been brought about in sure the type of protections that would withstand a constitutional and supreme court scrutiny. >> is the administration considering for ksm? >> i go back to what i said earlier in the sense that there are a series of things that are being looked at most appropriately be security and logistical concerns of those in new york has a decision is being made. >> with the president be involved as he is with the location of any civilian, be
involved in the consideration whether it should be moved to military commissions or with that interfere with the justice department? >> i think i've discussed why the president is involved and how he will take part. >> following on that, it was asked if there would be, if the military commissions was something you were considering in your response was there's a series of things being looked at so i would read that to mean that yes that is. is that correct? >> i would just say without eliminating all of the factors involved first and foremost there are as i have said before security concerns, logistical concerns about where you would hold the trial in new york, which would mean for the downtown area they would have to be taken into account, but as you heard the president say last week's he has not ruled out the fact that khalid sheikh mohammed would still be tried in the federal court of new york. so, i think that's first and
foremost that is what the president is focused on. >> has a fool all the other option? >> focused on the decision. >> the issue on the recess in planet you talk about people have not had a chance to vote because they are held by one senator over this that or the other. does the president viewed as an option to use recess appointments for something like craig becker who did have a majority but not super majority? and obviously -- >> i think there are -- the president has nominated very qualified individuals for the positions that he has nominated him for. we hope and believe after the discussion the president had with senator mcconnell on tuesday it's clear the senate heard the conversation and acted
but use all the president in a statement last night. he is not going to foreclose if what continues to stall. if the stalling tactics continue he's not using the recess appointments for anybody that he's nominated. the best way to avoid that, the best way to avoid that is for the senate to work through this process. >> in the case of becker, is that is on techniques? >> yes. >> so it is a possibility? >> and nominee that hasn't been approved is somebody that the president would consider -- >> if he only got 49 votes, what he considered it than? >> i'm not going to go through a whole host of different scenarios. mark? >> does the president believed that is what the founders had in mind with a recess appointment provision to give him the authority to circumvent action or inaction on the nominee's?
>> i haven't spoken about the theory on that, i think the practical measure is again understand that what the senate did last night in moving eight series of nominees the president thought were qualitatively and quantitatively different than what had been held at that point in the bush administration is still that way. there are 63 pending, they filled with about half of them so in starts 10-1 ratio with the bush administration we had a five period one ratio. i don't think the president believes that is an acceptable number either. the best way to deal with it the was by having the senate work for the process of voting up or down on the nominees. >> do you remember what the then senator obama objected when a senator reid kept the chamber in session during the last two of the administration's he could
not make recess appointments? >> if you have that -- i don't recall. >> one other question, i wondered what you saw that a cbs news new york times goldfine dinham loss 96 that showed only 12% of those surveys believed the attacks cut over the last year. >> i would say they called the wrong people. [laughter] know, i think what happened and one of the things that will go through this bipartisan jobs process is the state and local aid. if you look at the last on this job report, the number of state and local government jobs lost was 41,000 out of the monthly jobs report because they think in many cases and you see now, too, the importance of something
like state and local aid because as bad as the state budgets were last year they are actually worse this year, so i think as people may or may not have felt what they got from the federal the from it, they may have gotten something different from their state and local government in order to make up for a collective budget shortfall among the 50 states and something that exceeded $125 billion. so, look, i think that -- is it part of the frustration? of course. 95% of the working people in this country's all the taxes cut last year. >> what percentage? >> 95 but apparently only 12% felt it. >> back to the terror suspects.
i want to make sure i am clear, what exactly needs to happen before we get a decision? is the president for example waiting for a specific recommendation? >> they are in the process of working through the many issues some of which have been brought up by those in new york about the concerns of a trial. >> you also have to wait for congress to act to restrict the funding also. >> i don't think the president's decision -- i don't think the timing for the decision is held up by the timing of whether the senate or the house act on individual legislation. >> is he awaiting any recommendations from this report? >> i'm not going to get into the process of what is going on just to say that that process is
ongoing. >> would he favor a military trial short of being ordered to do so like congress? >> again i think that savanna asked that and this is a process that is ongoing. >> what kind of message are we sending the countries like india who are dealing in a tough way with the terrorists and also helping the united states on the terrorism being soft on the terrorism and what they feel back home. >> i didn't get the last part of that. >> many countries feel the u.s. should be tougher than those countries who are with the united states as dealing with the terrorists. >> look come khalid sheikh mohammed, i forget the exact date he was brought into custody. it has been a long time. one way or the other, khalid sheikh mohammed will be brought to justice by these decisions.
i don't think you can be any tougher than that. this president has without going into great detail taken the fight internationally to the terrorist suspects. we will seek justice, justice delayed by the way on behalf of thousands the portilla on september 11th because of the hateful acts of somebody like khalid sheikh mohammed. >> a follow-up please. >> let me go back to major. >> on the jobs bill setting aside the political question what is large enough to have a legitimate economic effect to create jobs? >> again, major, i don't think
that what has the umbrella of a jobs bill is coming to be the only components the house and the senate deal with in creating jobs. i think extending unemployment benefits is something important for those that don't have work and in sustaining their effort to help find work that isn't what the senate will deal with at the end of its recess, but as a component of a series of measures the president outlined either of the brookings speech he gave for the state of the union or the it's in his budget, so i don't look at what this -- i don't look at what an ad the nasturtium doesn't look at what is going to happen at the end of february when the senate considers these four provisions to be the end of that
consideration of measures dealing with economic stability. >> they continue to prioritize whatever follow-up legislation comes from the house on hotjobs over any other issues specifically health care. >> yes, looking at the president has -- >> it still long days the process of dealing with jobs legislation having it in smaller -- >> look the legislative process is -- it will work through itself. but, look, obviously some things are going to have to act on because employment benefits or cobra you meet deadlines for expiring benefits that these individuals that are unemployed need. i think we are pleased with the pacing of this. this was something to go from the state of the union to with the samet will consider understanding the house has
already passed a fairly big package, so you have half of that process donner. is the matter went to give you a chance to address something in the "washington post" editorial of that section by former attorney general mukasey. but me read it and get your response. contrary to what the homeland security and homeland security general said all right not only was there no authority or policy in place under the bush administration requiring all of those detained at the united states be treated as criminal defendants took a lot of authority was and is the opposite. >> read the last part again. >> picking up where? there was no authority or policy in place under the bush administration requiring all of those detained in the united states be treated as criminal defendants which mukasey said just store administration said was the bush administration policy. he goes on to write relative authority was and is the
opposite. do you disagree -- >> and don't think that either judge mukasey or attorney general mukasey would argue that in the process of somebody being an enemy combatant they wouldn't inflating their detention have access based on his role in to counsel. >> mahlon all other rights as he goes on to write i don't want to go through the whole thing, he says in the hamdi case, the habeas petitions were created as a legal venue but not all the other rights treaties as you are pushing the administration of granting a blanket -- >> that is what attorney general mukasey and others in the bush administration suggested because the military commissions were not set up and somebody like richard reid, aggrandized five
minutes after he is taken off the flight couldn't be all because we didn't of the military commissions. military commissions are not a venue for interrogation. military commissions or a venue for at adjudicating justice. attorney general mukasey says in his op-ed that the united states of america, the minute they walked and mirandized richard reid of the boston flight didn't have intention? it is a principle that has -- that we have had as long as this country has existed. i don't know if he presumed that attention didn't exist on that day. >> on the location, how concerned is the president or the white house legislation team about what appears to be a growing number of the senate democrats signing on to the legislation on the funding and what degree is the president telephoning members to try to persuade them to hold off or
change the wind? >> i don't know if the calls to the president have made. there may have been calls from the counsel's office or from legislative affairs to discuss people's opinion on legislation or potential upcoming votes. i will leave it at this -- >> it's an important consideration in this debate will not? >> there is no question about it and i think it is important aspect of this. it's an important aspect of the broad efforts in dealing with terrorism and its something the administration is working actively. >> the president wouldn't be personally involved why? >> i'm just saying i do not believe that he has made phone calls. u.s. specifically about phone calls to democrats about the legislation. i would go back and look at the phone logs sent around, but
nothing pops into my head but let me double check. >> i want to try the jobs bill again. on the debate coach at's point of time, senator reid changed course and challenged republicans to oppose the bill. that was a fairly significant change in tone and republicans feel they are set up politically to some degree. can they trust the president and the leadership in congress when they talk a lot of bipartisanship if this is the first and experience they are having since the state of the union and a lot of this bipartisan talk? >> of course republicans can trust the president. they were in a room not far from where we are sitting discussing many elements that will be voted on at the end of february on a jobs bill. >> again i think that you will
see a strong bipartisan vote. i think you will see a strong bipartisan vote on aspects that are not in this legislation but are part of what the democrats and republicans believe is important for stabilizing the economy. >> do they understand the frustration on this? it sounds like you're saying what is the big deal. >> if you're asking have we been frustrated on a bipartisan ship the better part of the last year? yeah. >> on this point the white house committee yesterday and was the process taking place, that changes. republicans are angry and confused. do you understand that? >> the president didn't talk about bipartisanship on accident. the president has throughout his tenure as president been frustrated we haven't worked together more, not just about what we are doing economically now but what we had to do
economically able more than a year rego when the times were even more dire. when we were facing job loss as we've discussed in the 700,000 range each month when we didn't know if we would wake up and the financial system that they would have collapsed. understand the frustration of democrats and republicans alike that regrettably the process of washington has overwhelmed a series of ideas the american people want to see work on behalf of the cares and concerns they have. absolutely. >> to questions. >> maybe come back at the end. it's like a cherry on top of a sunday. [laughter] >> going back to the question on the public perception of tax cuts. is that a marketing problem?
>> no, dan -- look it's hard to demonstrate to people that did get tax cut the federal level with a salles based on a budget shortfall in a state that we have to raise taxes and fees -- look, that's why -- i think that the american people look at a number of different factors that go into understanding and speaking to the frustration they have about this economy. these things don't happen in silos. what happens at the federal level than the state level are felt by both of those are felt by individuals on the ground. i think what it demonstrates is whether there are four aspects of package is moving through the
senate, the are going to have to be a series of things that happen in coordination with all levels of government in order to get this economy moving again. if the federal government ads money through recovery to stimulate the demand while states are having to pull back greatly, you will create is attrition that isn't quite ultimately be felt. that is why one of the big aspects of the recovery plan that was originally passed by the congress was state and local fiscal relations through fmap funding that cushion the blow. >> it was all set was supposed to make a maximize the economic impact -- minimize the political impact? >> you know, what i'd like to hire somebody to knock on
everybody's like the publisher clearinghouse guy and the big check and the balloon? sure. maybe it would have a grand affect. i think what the economic team found in the structure of the tax cut was that if i hand you $350 you know you are not likely to get and $350 every week or going to pocket and save that money because you are struggling economically. you are much more likely to put that into the economy and increased consumer spending and demand if you understand it is going to be something that you feel maybe not all at once but a little bit over a series of time that you can increase demand by that much. that is the way the tax cut was structured. donner marketers got kicked out of that. >> you guys have been very critical of republicans on the filibuster's so what message does the white house think it
sends on the jobs bill senator reid is practically forcing the filibuster by filing cloture before there has been even a minute of debate including the chance for amendments. sprick this is not going to be the last bite of the apple the senate has. these are for a very bipartisan ideas. one of them is named by the name involves a democratic senator and republican senator by definition a bipartisan idea for elements that individual week garner support and as a whole will garner bipartisan support. again this is not the last time that the senate is going to take up measures that involve economic stability. >> but you are not bothered by the way he is not allowing for any amendments? >> again we will have plenty of time to go back and do -- we need to extend a i'm plan
benefits. we need to extend small-business lending. all of that will be part of this. >> there are reports china asked the white house canceled its meeting with the dalai lama. do you know if that is true? >> obviously we discussed the fact this meeting would have been on the trip to beijing. before i announced we talked to them and said we are going to announce this meeting. i do not know if this be added to the to specific reaction was to cancel. that was their specific reaction the meeting will take place as planned next thursday. islamic the president discussed this with the dalai lama? >> we will have a readout of what they do talk about as a result of that. sprick and the position on the tibetan independence? >> i will get that information to you after that meeting. nice try though. >> a question on the don't ask don't tell. there was a report in the politico saying the white house
hasn't provided a clear path for on this issue following the union announcement. what kind of guidance is the president giving the lawmakers undertaking to review and has the president expected the legislation on his desk this year? >> the last part again? >> is the president said expecting it on his desk this year? >> the president outlined on the state of the union, and you heard secretary gates and admiral mullen discuss a process that will take place if that process results in legislation by the year's end, the president would certainly sign at. i think most importantly the president, the military and others feel like we have the best process structured moving forward to and don't ask don't tell. chris, obviously the president will discuss with the dalai lama
his belief that he and the chinese continue to discuss the issues that they have relating to tibet and i assume we will have a read out after that. do you have anything? >> with the president's support eighth moratorium on the discharges of don't ask don't tell until the pentagon completes its review? >> i would point you to what the testimony from defense to date, gates and mullen -- the process that will take place over the course of the next year. yes, ma'am. >> on tuesday at the news conference the president talked about the jobs bill. back then he mentioned to read this incrementally. he used the word -- >> i'm sorry. i can't hear you. >> the news conference tuesday the president talked about the
jobs bill mentioned to be done incrementally so even back then was he talking about splitting it or doing it -- >> again, they were ideas that were outlined, there were ideas the president outlined, again, the speech in december and in the state of the union ideas that the house didn't pass partly because the jobs package happened before the speech in december. there were different ideas that the senate was considering, not all of which included the president's ideas. we didn't think now and we still don't think now this is a one-shot deal, and i think that is what is most important to keep in mind. >> given what he called the frustration with the sheer amount of the cloture votes, has the president, the administration and through senator reid, ever thought about calling the republicans' bluff making them go to an actual
filibuster, especially over one of the long controversy all nominees? >> look good again it is a process that takes an inordinate amount of time on something that shouldn't be controversial. i think instead of -- i think the best way to move forward is to go through each of the qualified nominees that are held for no reason other than in some cases last week because somebody didn't get a couple of earmarks and instead do this in a way that takes qualified individuals that have been nominated and allow them to serve in government. i think that is the most important. >> robert, to questions. "the chicago tribune" reports that five days after scott lee cohen won the democratic nomination for lieutenant governor of illinois in the
primary he withdrew after reports of beating his wife, using a knife to threaten a girlfriend prostitute, taxi evasion and use of anabolic steroids. and my question, did the president ever have any concern about the former lieutenant governor nominee cohen being supported by mayor+et daley? >> i don't know who made what endorsement during the primary. obviously the president and many staffers here concerned about exactly what you read and think the right decision was made to leave the ticket. >> as the honorary president of the boy scouts of america what is the president's reaction to "the new york post" report that because the scouts have the policies similar to our armed forces, quote come in new york institutions are barring the scouts from meeting more recruiting all public schools.
>> i have not seen "the new york post" report and can have somebody -- >> for them to cut the scouts out of this? does he disagree with the scouts or what? [laughter] >> where are you on this, lester? >> i support the scouts, do you support the scouts? >> my son -- we are constructing a derby car as we speak. >> your son is a scout? >> she is and i think he's going to be disappointed if he doesn't do well, but his father tends to be construction will challenge.
a detailed look now at north korea military capabilities and weapons trafficking. you will hear from professor of the marine corps command and staff college. this is part of today's forum hosted by the institute for korean-american studies. it's about one hour and ten minutes. >> thank you for breeding the portal whether to come out here and listen to us speak. i am also grateful i am sitting on the panel with so many people i admire so much truly. finally i would like to thank dr. kim and icas for giving me the onerous coming to speak here. on the subject matter which i think is very serious also not talked about a lot. and finally, before i get into the meeting of the discussion i need to pass on the views i
present are my own and do not necessarily represent the policy or the position of the marine corps university or the united states government. let's talk about the north korean military threat. i think that the movie that we had before all else took the panel today was very compelling. i would only say it becomes even more compelling if you tie a nuclear capability to the missile particularly something they are years away from achieving but still quite ominous. i'm not going to talk about that today because i think the movie did a very good job. what i'm going to talk about are two things. first, the north korean threat to the security and stability of of the korean peninsula, and as that follows the region as a whole, and i am also going to talk more shortly but in some detail the north korean threat from preparation support of
terrorism. let me talk about the military first if i may. many assume north korea's chief of military, like its people, has been starved by the regime's isolation but in fact the opposite is in many ways true. the keen reason why the populace is short on resources particularly fuel and food is because the majority of these have been directed at troops. as easy as it seems to dismiss the start country and it's often sick leader north korea's conventional military has adjusted to the dire economic times and is far more capable than many analysts realize. the armed forces is not just its nukes could wreak havoc on the region. there are two aspects of today's north korean military that warrant a careful look. the first is the mayor to decade-old bill of north korea's's asymmetrical forces, and what i mean by that in this case is forces that carried out on conventional missions. the second matter is reorganization much of west pitched resulted in a
and to exacerbate the prayer, between five and 20% of the systems are assessed to be equipped with kevin gold musicians. all this means that potential damage artillery alone according to estimates from both south korean and u.s. defense officials could reach 200,000 casualties and that's just on the first day of the attack. before c-span, north korea political and cultural center backed the 1980's in a matter of hours. charisse ballistic missiles are the second asymmetric component of north korea's arsenal. since the 1990's, pyongyang in numbers commander control and doctrine to the north koreans now possess 200 missiles and more than 600 scads.
the latter with range is between 30850 kilometers, not to target literally every inch of the south korean landmass. north korea has also added the ss 21 system, and also be a platform to its missile arsenal. known as the cayenne two. the vintage sleep version of the ss 21 uses solid fuel and can be moved very quickly, with a range of 120 to 160 kilometers in greater accuracy than most other missiles, it could easily target u.s. missiles south of seoul. interestingly, these first two components that i've just spoken out, artillery and missile, would be used in tandem if an attack to way spirit that mr. reader commiseration of north korea's military during the late 1990's. both types of courses are now commanded by artillery officers who would in accordance with their training.turn consider missile systems to simply be art
tillery systems with a longer range and would target them accordingly. in an attack many of north korea's artillery systems living for soul and much of the surrounding province while missile attacks at every keynote in south korea. as for north korea special operations forces, south korean estimates now place their numbers as high as 180,000 men. north korea special operations forces are probably among the best trained, best fed and most motivated of all forces in their military here they routinely undergo intense training that a good turn 50 of sand for a ten kilometers in one hour, hygiene and extreme cold weather, martial arts methodologies that include fighting with three to 15 opponents and even using spoons and forks as weapons. troops also engage in intense marksmanship training and even daily life during training. they can attack quickly,
reaching keynotes in south korea by aircraft for tunnels in the dmz or even maritime vessels. there's a very interesting call. there's a lot of sls and north korea in the latest iraq mystery national defense white paper appeared to please allow me to read a short quote from that document. this attack in the special operations forces straight. the troop thinks the special wherefore preaches approximate 100,000 by collecting light infantry divisions in the fort area not bending the light in which he battalions to resume class. the army is concentrating massively on enhancing the capabilities of special warfare as evidenced by the stepping up of nighttime mountaineering training and street warfare training. very interesting stuff. the combined use of north korea's asymmetric north korea's asymmetric worthless would almost certainly incite panic during any attack on the south. in the confusion, it is
possible, perhaps even likely, that enough cracks my doping south korea's united states offensive to a northern maneuver forces, infantry, are burned, mechanized forces to move forward and take down. it is no coincidence that over the past 15 years north korea has moved many of its conventional forces to forward positions, oscar your quarter is on the border. there are two primary invasion corridors along the border and you can see this on a map. one of the case on this on quarter. it's a very interesting stuff. if you put all this together, an attack would inflict casualties to the tune of hundreds of thousands, the majority of them probably civilians and many of them in fuel. so, speaking of those re-organized maneuver forces that have been moved closely to the attack orders. then he read another quote if i may from the iraq ministry white
paper. recently the army reorganized into structures by reinforcing the firepower of the first echelon in this area thereby attaining a surprise effect with over while main combat power in the initial engagement. and for those of us who study north korea's military is important to point out the initial engagement is by all means the most important engagement, the engagement that will take place over the first hours and days of the attack. so very important stuff. well, what does the north korean army, military if you will, been doing thus far. for those of us have fallen north korean military know that december through march is what's called the winner in turn winter training. they are not harvesting crops, they're not planting crops comes at the time of year when they train of life.
training the share is far, only about halfway through the winter training cycle, it has evolved infantry, special operations forces, armor, an unusually large exercise involving the workers present red guard forces that also reportedly included acted duty troops. there's also some stuff is extremely interesting and in my view quite compelling. in addition, long-range artillery live fire drills occurred on the west coast, north of pyongyang. each of the 400 million rocket launcher is, multiple rocket launchers that he spoke of earlier. those systems capable of hitting seoul. those are some rather large exercise is compared to what they've done in the past. particularly given the fact that their live fire exercises. another unusual event that occurred than many of us who follow the path in south korea have observed was quite a bit of interest is in highly unusual live fire drills on the west
coast through the northern limit line. these events feature a variety of systems over three days i might add, very systems that fire more than 350 or 23 shelves, which is allowed. very close to the northern limit line. some of them as close as a kilometer and a half to the defect oc border separating the two koreas. the drills conducted by the northern limit line or the nml are target timing exercises. this involves simultaneously volumes around 90 minute single target. shells must be fired at different times with systems farther away firing first. it takes a lot of coordination and a lot of planning, especially considering the high amount of shells that fire. reportedly, several different calgary artillery systems were used. very interesting stuff. there may be some questions about that afterwards obviously. well, why is all this important? these three pillars, if you
will, of north korea's asymmetric capability, they're special operations forces, their long-range artillery in their short range ballistic missiles, including three rocket overground and the cayenne to. these are the primary threats that would open up the war, excuse me, would open up the war with south korea. well, why is this a compelling? in my view it's so compelling because is south korea's capabilities right now, which are lacking in many ways. please let me address this one by one. first of all, the s. rpm threats involved to take the ballistic missile system essentially. the first one is obviously the patriot missile system. well, the south koreans just recently, in the past year or so has started deploying the antiquated largely back to retrieve missile system. this is a system that uses a shotgun type last to try and
take out incoming ballistic missiles and is not very effective against attacks by north korea have after the effective missile system because that is the upgrade, the pack three, which they have none of them may have some in a few years but don't right now. the only pack three missiles is and from the korean peninsula are manned by united states over personnel and they u.s. bases. what is the problem here? south korean population centers from military bases that don't have american troops on them are very susceptible right now, this second, to attack from ballistic missiles by the north koreans. in addition, as i mentioned earlier in the paper, the north koreans have about 200 no downs. people tradition and talk about the no has been a threat to japan and that's true. they would also likely be fired, specially the ones near the chinese border out of other areas in south korea.
so just pusan entry judo. one would be using those systems we heard described earlier and that's the sm three missile package and is carried on an aegis-equipped ships with south koreans have in their class ships and it's very accurate for taking out at higher tiered missile like to know don. by the way, the japanese already had this two-tiered system. pack three for lower bubbles and sm three for higher levels. in the party got ships and protecting our population centers and military bases. >> this that's why the s. rpm threats is particularly compelling. let's talk about the special operations but if i may. the special operations forces have grown by about 50%, although there's some disagreement with the americans on that. i would concur with the south koreans. a lot of that, most of that has been through what they call
light infantry brigade, although no forces are exactly like u.s. forces and we shouldn't your image. they are very similar to u.s. ranger type units. a way to counter that, one of the ways to counter that is of course with south korea's own sos forces. south korea only have two left their own special operations forces time, ten c-130s. they are severely lacking in their own airlift. when i spoke of this at a conference a year and half ago at nyu, iraq scholar from the university came up and said, you know bruce, when i was in the iraq army as a special forces guy and i remember having to sit on the tarmac and waiting for them to fly from okinawa to pick us up because we didn't have enough of our own. this, folks, is the problem. attack about as rpms, long-range artillery. when you talk about -- let me address that if i may.
when it comes to long-range artillery, that is obviously as you guys know the north korea's artillery and as rpms in the same boat. those systems, which you can see pictures at if you would end a daily person very good pictures on there recently. those guns, the most important thing that we have to do with those guns bizarre counter battery fire. and that is a very big concern for the rocks. in early 2006, commission was traded from the united states second infantry division to the iraq infantry missions. that is the problem? and this is another issue that the south korean military has. the south korean military does not have the proper fee for i write not to do a good counter battery mission. so if you're talking about the time to target mission that it takes from getting a shot fired at shooter firing back, according to recent reports, sometimes it take as long as an
hour for them. that is unsatisfactory. you've made. you're also going to talk about another very important that is integrating it with air. in other words, the way the u.s. military operates we have the united states army colonel was spared when you get fired from artillery you coordinate with your own air so that not only is your artillery firing back at them as they are. the roc don't have that capability yet, but right now their best capability to report that is called americans before i and american united states air force aircraft. so problematic. why do i bring this up? why do i bring up the fact that these three key asymmetric threats, which where not even talking about removal forces right now. what do i bring this up? the reason why is because a few days ago, about two weeks ago,
admiral blair, the director of national intelligence testified before congress. let me read this quote. because the congressional military capabilities gap between north and south korea has become so overwhelmingly great and prospects for reversal of this gap so remote,. although there were other reasons for the north to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weakness as a major factor and one that can and is likely festers will not easily dismissed. okay, admiral blair's remarks are particularly -- are particularly disturbing and misleading because they say specifically that conventional capabilities gap between north korea and south korea have become so great. please allow me to point out that the military of the south koreans is really, really well equipped to take on the maneuver
force dominated north korean army of 1990. of course, now it's 2010. they are not, however, where they should be when it comes to handling the asymmetric forces that i discussed earlier. nor had they been able to adjust to for the large-scale urbanization of the new workforce is that occurred in north korea since 2006. very important step because those maneuver forces can then be able to take over some place where cracks are developed because it would be the asymmetric forces have done. so specifically, when it comes to these three pillars of north korea's asymmetric capabilities, short-range ballistic missile or threat on the long-range artillery and special operations for threat, the south koreans have a lot of capabilities they have yet to develop and they are very weak in that area, specifically those areas. the nonnuclear forces but north korea has taken shall much corrupt and from so many resources on in order to
continue to threaten the south remain an ominous and compelling threat for a variety of reasons, many of which are in the paper that will be posted on the icas website if you want more details. some of which i discussed already. those who have carefully analyzed the correlation of forces, opposing firepower ratios or terrain dominated strategy on the korean peninsula and the order of battle and disposition of forces of the north and south korean militaries realize that the military alliance can and should take the north korean nonnuclear threat seriously. please allow me to take a sip. people keep telling me to quit smoking cigars. they're just wrong. the second military thread i would like to discuss from north korea is that of proliferation and support to terrorism. and i'm going to do this country
by country. and i'm going to take less time to discuss this. i think most of you are more knowledgeable on this anywhere and so the military as i discussed. so i'll probably hit on something super to hurt you alumni addressed theory a first. i think everyone knows about the nuclear reactor that syria had, which was essentially kim jong ii which we now know. thank you, israel. everyone knows now from the report that we've read that essentially the north koreans built a copy of pyongyang and then built a fake roof of her as so people wouldn't see it from the air. lots of great stuff on that. the bottom line is north korea proliferated their plutonium-based nuclear program to syria. there's not a smoking gun on that. it's a smoking 155 solider. north korea also proliferates
chemical weapons systems through syria, both for missiles and for artillery. in fact, the north koreans have actually helped the north korean -- have helped the syrians build their own chemical weapons factory. so speaking of artillery and missiles, the north koreans have proliferated every single type of study that they built, scud b., scsi, and the extended range scud. in fact, if you tie that chemical weapons thing in the missile thing together, about two years ago a bunch of syrian thickness range and engineers were killed as were a bunch of iranian technicians and engineers when they were trying to test a missile that had a warhead on it, a scud d. that was fair and gas and reportedly there was also north koreans present at that firing. the north koreans also proliferates a conventional weapons to the syrians. well, the biggest proliferation -- the biggest
customer north korea has is iran. we're going to talk about proliferation of nuclear technology, plutonium for syria or iran bats a tu collaboration. there's more than what i know about because i don't sit in a skiff all day. but the one thing is for sure is that dozens of north korean technician, scientists, engineers have gone back and forth to iran for a period of several years now, going back to at least 2002. in 2002 should be important for many of us when you think back what happened in 2002? yeah, that's when north korea and pakistan were forced to break off their nuclear collaboration. so really this collaboration is been going on since at least then. probably more intensified because of what happened with pakistan. we also know that the north koreans and iranians are collaborating on a 500-kilogram warhead for a missile,
presumably to nodong known as the job free in iran. speaking of missiles, there is no one that north korea sells more missiles do then i ran. every scad i mentioned about serious and the hu nodong. and in 2005 they sold 18 systems that were devised from the old soviet ss and sixth system, which was a submarine-based missiles, ms obm. the north koreans converted that to a land-based missile and then they sold 18 of them to iran. it is a range of about 4000 kilometers. suggest using that missile the iranians can hit europe. of course it could already hit and they call that a shop for
her. from artillery, they sold the long-range guns, some of them attacked that it sold some of those to iran. they sold on small arms. they've even pulled the naval craft, including submarines. there's also more to this picture they're not, but i get to that in a second. they also proliferates from weapons and missiles to a number of countries in the middle east, south asia and africa. which leaves me to terrorism. when it comes to supporting terrorism in very recent years, very recent year since 2005, north korea has provided weapons and training to both hezbollah and the tamil tigers. in fact, north korea was providing everything from small arms to artillery to naval craft for the jamel tigers almost right up until the time they were destroyed by the sri lankan army. and then of course comes the north koreans lost a customer. north korea is now well documented as having built a
tunnel for hezbollah that made it so difficult for the idf to get after the 2006 war. they also provided small into hezbollah including brackets that are fired into israel. the evidence points to the dealing with hezbollah continuing to go on right now. north koreans have dealt with hezbollah largely through this theory and in the iranians. but especially through the iranians and particularly through the ir gc, their key intermediary. so let's get to that. in the case of the iranians, the north koreans have dealt with hezbollah primarily for merely to the rotc. this permits to be a relationship for several years now and is ongoing. but the north koreans also deal with the rotc on a variety of arms deals with iran. that is, what comes to supporting terrorism the north koreans are there providing
support for collaborating with two documented terrorist or terrorist supporting groups. hezbollah and the ir gc. this is well-known and continues today. so it is rather disturbing at least to me that north korea has not been put back on the list of nations supporting terrorism. dealing with hezbollah and the irgc is not a minor infraction and the dealings with these two organizations have not been minor. nor have they been sure. both relationships have been ongoing for a number of years. north korea's proliferation both to rogue nations into terrorist organizations is both disturbing and a threat. not only to the u.s., but two allies in the regions where weapons and training are being proliferated. so, those are my comments into very serious threat that i see emanating from north korea. not even talking about the long-range missile threat, not even talking about the nuclear threat. i see proliferation and support to terrorism as a very important
threat. i also see the often not talked about proactive north korea's conventional forces against the south korean military is a very important and compelling threat. and that concludes my presentation. >> well, thank you very much, bruce. now the floor is open. at first, we want the army colonel. >> by mccaughey at this as a serving soldier. these are my personal opinion but not those of the department of defense or u.s. government. bruce, you make a compelling argument. north korea is a complex, very, very difficult threat. and still a threat to security in the peninsula. editing has evaporated as a global threat. he points out that in the phase of their economic problems in
the military is still transforming. you know, dealing with their problems but they are coming and remaining a formidable military. the problems -- the challenges in the north are multiple. the missile, nuclear, conventional threat, the asymmetric threats and nonproliferation, terrorism and when you didn't mention, one thread near and dear to my heart is potential for regime collapse and what happens after. one of the things that i'm concerned about is what i would call the dual use of those asymmetric threat particular. what happens when there is regime collapse, many of those threats, particularly the softer, but nuclear and what happens to those missiles and weapons of mass distraction when there is no longer central
control by the regime and military coherence and what happens. given that north korea has enough called age renders the a guerrilla dynasty in their business on their operations forces. i would ask, what do you foresee in when the regime collapses, the kind of security challenges in the south korea and the international community will face in the north with those threats. and not to discount the conventional attack him and you know, the decision to go to war, which i think first and foremost we have to deter and prepared for. but the long-term threats i think will exist. and i think those same threats that exist in post-conflict will post collapse. i'd be interested to hear about that. i'd like to take exceptional one point you made about south
korean special operations forces and c-130s. if they are going to conduct counter stopped operations in south korea, the most effective air platform is not c-130, but as a helicopter, just like in counterinsurgency today is a helicopter force, the mobile capability to counter south koreans. i think those c-130s are important for infiltration into the north, but it is a helicopter capability that is most important for mobility in the south. and lastly, i'd ask you given were in the winter training cycle and looking at it over time and you've outlined the fact that they seem to be doing some very sophisticated time on target, seen those at santa barbara range of dare, the messiah doing it very difficult to do and something that takes a lot of training, a lot of capability. so when this winter training
cycle, they seem to be doing more and more than i have in the past and they know going in cycle of the time you assess this as being more in usual, especially given their economic challenges that they have. you know, they are still able to commit the resources in the training to be able to execute a fairly high level of training by any standard. and that you foresee that has continued what was called over the years, creeping normalcy, as they've shifted forces south and developed those capabilities to be ready for some kind of an eventual attack. >> okay. why don't you take it then. we'll go. not excellent comment, dave. and for those of you who don't know about colonel david maxwell, is a very respected
analyst on north korean issues in particular soft tissues. so i would yield to him and a lot of those issues. in fact evaporated question i would like to ask him. the threat from soft after the attack. well, we don't know for sure but i think there's an interesting corollary that we can look at. and that's what happened with the romanians after the attack. the romanian army, when the communist government collapsed, essentially, you know, they turned over to the people with notable affection and that is their equivalent forces, their special forces guys. and as some of you probably know, they studied the collapse because it bothered them. so that's a very good question about the soft, what they will do. those soft guys are not only well-trained, they they are more brainwashed and the remainder of the north korean army,
especially most of it. they want us to look at past president. it's very interesting in that submarine, that song go class submarine was captured and when it washed up on south korean shores. a lot of the members of the crew killed themselves instead of being captured, you know, rather than be captured they killed themselves. so these guys are pretty serious. i think that the majority of the north korean army, should we fight a war and i hope that doesn't happen as much or more so than anyone else. but should we have to ever having forbid i do war. if they're going to be defeated and that's the case, most render or give in. i don't think that's going to be the case with the soft. a challenge for the rocks reticular lee. i would say another challenge is
missile. they didn't bring up missiles, but if there is a collapse of the south korean regime and their forces that are competing and perhaps one of them is getting past powers involved, one of the most frightening scenarios would be they decided to shoot a nodong off at some place like japan. that's really very frightening and something that i think folks that are still on active duty and civilians in dod who work in planning circles are planning for. at least one would hope so. the word i get is that they are. i would also ask how capable is the helicopter lift for the south korean military. i guess we could talk about this offline. but that was a very interesting point you brought up. if you ask me something that was very good about the wtc, the winter training cycle. was it more unusual than normal? and that's a very good question. i have an answer for you on that
one. the north koreans, then watching the north korean winter training cycle for those of lance corporal in 1978, before some of you were born. i know i'm an old man. but you know, it's always been -- what is going to be the geewhiz thing that the cancer does this winter to make us go say, that's interesting. and the cancer used to be transfixed. but there's been stuff like in 1990 make for example they took a bunch of armor out and they ran it around and we're talking hundreds and hundreds of tanks. sometimes things we didn't even know were in the order of battle. in some of them so close to the dmv can look down from ten to john and say they had winter training cycles where they have large, huge mechanized forces training exercises which have been unusual. they have this winter training exercises, lots of stuff.
that this winter's training exercise where they actually did a very, very, very clever thing, in my view in the nl live artillery. up to four been fired so far. that's a lot of shells. that's a lot of artillery fire and spirit they've been trying to find a way for the past two or three years that they could intimidate south korea over the now out, they cannot import them in the political scheme and not ending but taken a lot of casualties. they did a pretty good job doing it. and some people think, i haven't seen it in the press, i think it has to do with the fact that general kim come shake on the general staff was put in an position for some people thought were the motion, that i think he was made the corps commander of fourth court. fourth-quarter as the court that
borders on the northern limit line. this is a smart guy. he's one of kim jong bills. they planned this intimidating exercise with their firing shells up to a kilometer away from this and ordered to not only show us that they have this great art tillery capability but japan to bring up the issue of the northern limit line again. didn't take any casualties. the first is that it rocked were inspired up to 100 cells basically into the air and after that didn't do anything. so very interesting stuff. was this unusual to share what's happening so far? gas. is it unprecedented? now. next are they will try to do something else unusual to catch her attention. the point is connected to set up very well, dave. the north korean army conventional forces come in the nuclear forces is something they continue to work on to spend a
very big amount of resources on in the capability that continues to evolve in order to threaten the south. that's their specific intent. i think it is something we should take seriously. great comments, thank you. >> thank you, dave. larry, do you want to chip in? does the button, push it. >> let me say couple of words about bruce's comments on proliferation. and basically this is to supplement what he said about what north korea is doing. president obama came out with the statement just a few days ago, stating that there was no statutory reasons, no reserves in u.s. statue to bring north
korea back on the u.s. list of state sponsors of terrorism. in a high ranking administration official was quoted as saying that north korea has not supported terrorism or terrorist groups since the 1980's. now, the reason for this decision really is to try to sustain a nuclear talks of that administration is trying to reside at north korea tried to get north korea back into some kind of participation in the six party talks. that was the rationale for the bush administration removing north korea from the terrorism in 2008. and that is the same rationale for the president's statement that there no statutory
justification for restoring north korea to the terrorism list. i just wish that the administration would be honest enough to state this reason. that this is the real reason why they don't want north korea on the terrorism list. rather than disputing what bruce has laid out quite accurately about the factual nature of north korea's support, cooperation with the iranian revolutionary guards in through the iranian revolutionary guard is act of arms and training support for hezbollah. and we need to look no further than these north korean shipments to iran, which have been intercepted this year in the last six months.
the big shipment that was seized in dubai in july, the shipment that was seized in the aleutian 76 aircraft in bangkok, huge shipment of rocket, rocket launchers, short range shoulder fired surface to air missiles, tons of this stuff. where does -- what does iran use such large quantities of these kinds of weapons for? this is what the iranian revolutionary guards sense to hezbollah. this is what hezbollah is armed with. and these north korean rockets and rocket launchers in short range surface to air missiles are exactly those kinds of weapons. and to try to argue that such large quantities of these
weapons are not ultimately bound for hezbollah and also possibly even,. i think frankly, crosses the line into the ludicrous realm at this point of time. the israelis know all about this. the israeli press talks about this all the time. and the only reason it seems to me these israeli government does not come out publicly and lay out what it knows about all of this is that it doesn't want to embarrass the u.s. government and its policies of keeping north korea off the u.s. list of state sponsors of terrorism. not embarrassing the bush administration and not embarrassing the obama administration. now, remember looking back at
the bush administration, that it was only after, and dennis knows all about this, it was only after some very strong threats from congress that the bush administration revealed any information at all about north korean involvement in that serious nuclear reactor that persists for this about. and even then, i would argue that the bush administration didn't tell the whole story. because the whole story is also about iran's involvement in that react her. but the israelis have photographs of iranian nuclear officials visiting the react to her. and according to reports in the german press, citing german intelligence sources, iran was the financier for that fury and
react to her. so there is really an issue of what i would call truth telling here in terms of the real reasons why north korea is not on the u.s. list of state sponsors of terrorism. now on the north korean military, here i'm going to take a little bit of a contrary view. seems to me we need to say a little bit more about their weaknesses. the weaknesses of north korean conventional forces and those weaknesses are severe and they have deep into year after year since the collapse of the soviet union at the end of the 1980's. and i'll just briefly go over three points. north korean conventional forces have no sustainability. they could not wage a major war after just a few days.
yes, the army got more food as bruce pointed out that the masses of north korean do. at the caloric intake of north korean rank-and-file infantrymen is only 600, 700 calories a day compared to 200 or 300 to the masses of north korea. this is not a sustainable diet in the war fighting situation. and part of the reason why the north korean rank-and-file troops were getting more food over the last few years than the north korean population as a whole was getting was that south korea was providing much of this food. and we saw the photographs in march 2008 of those north korean tracks delivering south korean red cross marked bags of rice to their troops on the dmz.
this is an example of what poor shape they are in. another related element in sustainability as but i think our greater limits, frankly, on their ability to insert the special operations forces into south korea. the information that i have is that for the last two years, those eight and two infiltration aircraft, which our military leaders use to stress so much in their testimonies to congress as part of the north korean conventional threats have been shut down for lack of fuel. and they are no longer able to operate and train with these aircraft on a sustained basis. but perhaps their greatest weakness lies i think in their armor and mass infantry.
here i have a different view of roost, in terms of their ability to penetrate, to any degree, south korean territory across the dmz. i believe they have lost much of this capability. their armor is extremely old, vintage 1950's, 1960's for the most part. their infantry is made up of those 16-year-old draftees who wept, through years and years of malnutrition. four years ago, they reduced the minimum height requirement for their draftees from four feet 11 to four feet two inches. there's only one explanation for this and that is malnutrition of these troops. food and fuel requirements go way up for a force like the north korean military and a war fighting capability, compared to
their requirements for food and fuel in a peacetime capability. they do not have the fuel and the food to boost their resources in a war fighting situation and they know what. moreover, reuss mentioned u.s. air power, a very good point. the combination of hundreds of tactical fighters that we could deploy into south korea, within two to three days in the outbreak of a conflict plus squadrons of mass heavy bombers would bring over there within two to three days again would obliterate their mass armor and their mass infantry before they would have a chance to make any
kind of significant penetration into south korea. we need to accurately assess the north korean military threat, all of its components. for no other reason than the requirement on our military globally are so expensive now on the streams of our military are so great, be it afghanistan, iraq, possibly iran in the future, gehman. that we need to accurately access exactly what we need to contribute to south korea's defense. i do believe that in the past there have been a tendency to exaggerate the north korean threat of an all-out invasion of south korea. and i think for too long, the pentagon ignored the evidence of
deterioration of north korean conventional military. now the pentagon i think is beginning to talk more about those and is beginning to make more judgments on that basis. so there is another side to i think what bruce said. certainly south korea needs to take many of the steps that bruce laid out. the united states needs to keep a very robust naval and air presence in south korea and offshore of south korea. send the right kind of message to the north koreans. resident obama promised south korea discussions on enhanced deterrence last june. i don't know whether those discussions are underway or not. we need to get them underway because it seems to me there are some things the united states could do to enhance our
deterrence capability, especially with regard to our naval and air power and in doing so send a stronger message to the north koreans that if they should ever contemplate attacking south korea, they will be obliterated. and i think that the message we need to keep sending to them. and again, i think there are some things we could be doing that we are doing now to some perhaps a stronger message in their direction. >> and now, catherine. let katherine respond. and then you can sum up. >> okay. thank you. it's a great pleasure to be here. thank you too transfixed for organizing a very worthwhile seminar. thank you particularly to bruce for answering a question i've had for a long time which is what is the current state of
conventional armed forces? that's what i really appreciate your good work on that. i would like to add first of all, just one short of recomment to what larry said about the weaknesses of the soldiers. i was struck when i was in north korea the summer of 08, a year and a half ago at the appearance of soldiers. i saw quite a number of units of soldiers in the southern part of the country around several different areas all the way down to the dmz in southwest to change on. and all the groups of soldiers that i saw on the road, at the dmz, wherever, at checkpoint were considerably thinner and more obviously non-nourished than ordinary people i saw in
thin young or walking along the roads in the southwestern part of the country. i was surprised at that. i mean, the soldiers faces were drawn. their bodies were extremely thin. they were small. so i think when we think about diverting food to the military, something else is going on other than soldiers are being well fed. that's what i observe. my other comments are about the issue of intent. i tried to say this briefly. we're running out of time i think. it is well known when we talk about a threat, a threat is the combination of capability and
intent. not simply capability. and that's where i think we need to focus a bit more attention as we discussed the north korean threat. my field is history. what i've done is studied the history of communist countries, particularly with the soviet union, china, all still eastern europe. and so i look at them over there holter jack three and teach about it this way. and so i see it in terms of evolution. in these countries always of course has evolved as all countries do. we have a tendency in the case of north korea to treat it as some sort of static phenomenon off partly because we don't know enough about it. we tend not to think of it historically. if we look at it as a sort of static thing, we are inevitably going to misread the situation.
what i see just briefly from the historical evidence and contemporary evidence is that by the 1980's the regime realized their rate system wasn't working and they can provide economically for their people. this is what he said in no uncertain terms to gorbachev. and confidential conversation that we have records of. so the overwhelming reality already by that time was the need to protect themselves given the fact that they were not able to succeed economically at even the most basic level. then, with the collapse of the soviet union and 91, the overwhelming reality was extreme economic on their ability with the loss of soviet subsidies.
extreme vulnerability and extreme security vulnerability with the loss of the soviet union and soviet bloc countries had the reaction to put it simply was naturally to enhance their own security by means of the kinds of steps that bruce is outlined. they are various very effectively to enhance their economic saturation by marines of proliferation. bruce outlined very effectively. but as we seek to counter the very real negative consequences from their proliferation in particular and also the very real potential threat that exists by potential of their remaining economic military capability. if we're going to do that
skillfully and effectively we've got to understand what's actually happening inside the country among the elite because were going to strike an effective bargain with them we have to understand what their motivations are, what the driving is. there is ample evidence today that the elite has lost confidence in ideology i would say quite absolutely that the ideology is dead. that their system is not working and they are very really seeking to gain the skills, the contacts and the resources needed to survive in the larger world as individuals and as a country, primarily as individuals however. and so they are very actively
engaging with people in china, india down, and a number of european countries and attempting also to enlarge their engagement with individuals in the united states in order to survive, in order to have the kinds of skills that will enable them to cope with the larger globalized economy. as an individual and also for their country as long as it remains to be able to cope. and again, it's really essential to understand that this process is already happening in north korea. and so, what we have is an opportunity to harness that, to
make it more profitable for them to expound this kind of learning that they are doing and collaborating on all kinds of peaceful enterprises, agriculture, energy, all sorts of things. and make the cost of the negative and threatening behaviors, such as proliferation increase. what if we attempt to simply stop things such as proliferation without providing an effective alternative for them economically, that's unlikely to succeed. i'll stop with that. >> ruse. >> yeah, i'll keep this reef. well, larry and i have a lot of respect for each other's analysis, but we disagree and north korean military and have argued about it frequently including i recall over the last
time and up with a lot of beers and atlanta. great city by the way. but let me address some of his comments if i may which were very good comments that were well thought out. specifically north korea and the assist. the ones i talk to as a few days is what they're talking about and at a minimum they can take sole under the right conditions and that's all she wrote. they take sole, wipeout congee province. it is no longer your country with the largest gdp. they're now back back being a third world country again. as the food coming from south korea, absolutely i concur because the north koreans take food that they get from everybody, no matter who it is and give it to the army, including south korea. certainly they got a flood of money from south korea particularly during the sunshine policy on steroids that existed during the saturday platform.
and how that affects training for the north korean special operations forces. certainly i've heard the same rumors that they have not flown in. by the way, in a end to flies off chairs and. so if they are short and kerosene or were short and kerosene recently certainly the pilots may not have had a lot of training although i'm not sure how much actual training pilots to fly a plane that's essentially cropduster the curious truth because that's what it is. it's about playing. that is not affect did the jump capability of the special operations forces because they, like their south korean counterparts jump out of balloons or off towers. they do not almost every job out of aircraft. so fuel, understood, got it. pilot proficiency doesn't affect the proficiency of the special
so, you know, interesting stuff. well, and you know, what we said -- what you said about the pentagon mix of jogging that it decline of the north korean threat, i agree. during the 1990's it was a constant fight. i was an analyst back then at the nation's to fill a defeat could intelligence agency and we said look they are evil thing, changing. the focus isn't on the forces and nobody wanted to admit that. and that was wrong. but the forces have a golf and i think it is also wrong to go in
the other direction and say welcoming you know, they have had food and fuel problems and some guys with malnutrition problem therefore they can't fight anymore, they are not capable. it's not the case. they know their resource problems. they know the issues they face, and they have made a concerted effort to adjust. so, i just think we should keep that in mind. and also, i agree with a strong response. i would just ask we all keep in mind of the fight a war and the north koreans know this as we do, if the fight a war like the north koreans don't need to take the whole peninsula. they just need to wipe out large areas of the province, and having that threat -- having that threat means we have mutually assured destruction in miniature on the korean peninsula with the face-off between north and south korean militaries and when it comes to the asymmetrical forces, south koreans are at a disadvantage. we are talking about traditional
resources. great stuff and just felt erythromycin on this. katherine bald of i would like to point out one thing and that is intent. i believe from talking to many people, north and south korean obviously north koreans have become self and are now south korean citizens, the north koreans know they cannot beat a combined rok u.s. force, there for the intent of one is to talk about that is to get the u.s. off the korean peninsula. when any of this happens the paradigm changes significantly. north korea has not given up its dream of defeating were dominating self korea. this is why the north koreans took to the south koreans and every time -- particularly when they talk to us it's like we really need to ask the americans to leave. when the americans are not there, when we don't have a commitment to south korea, a
real commitment with forces, the paradigm change is considerable and that is why i think it's a little dangerous to downplay what the capabilities of our of the north korean army. they have many weaknesses and also strengths they have gone after because of those weaknesses. something to keep in mind. that's it. [applause] >> thank you. at the end of the day there are the risks particularly on a friday standing between everybody and their dinner and going home and also having a degree of built in redundancy to a presentation. so many of the issues bruce spoke to and some of the panelists addressed. i will touch on what i will be presenting, but i hope that it will help you understand as i preface this by stating first of all of course i'm not a policymaker so i am not here to reflect the policy of the united states or necessarily here speaking for the intelligence community her say although
certainly most of my comments at least a tracked pretty much with some of the ways we tend to see this country. so hopefully we can gain a little bit more insight into what people often called in the intelligence black hole. i will be very kind of informal in my presentation working some firm brief notes. first of all the black hole analogy on north korea is quite unfortunate when you think about it because it implies two things: first of all, it implies that our policy towards the democratic people's republic of korea is somehow based on lack of information or less information necessary and to make a wise policy. and i will argue as we go through some of these key issues that our policy makers have to deal with that we do have a good amount of insight into north korea's capabilities and intentions. second, it really underestimates
the efforts of the 16 agencies that work against the number three target within the intelligence community that our office within the director of national intelligence has been established to kind of coordinate and integrate their efforts, and rather than the black hole i personally tend to see north korea as a puzzle. north korea is a puzzle for which we have enough pieces to see a picture, a picture that is comprehensible, a picture that speaks adequately to the two elements of threat kathryn spoke of, the capability and intent and truth be told we don't have all the pieces to the puzzle and what happens is we don't like the picture we often see of north korea so we sit and cursed the absence of the pieces missing when in essence we have most of the big picture pieces necessary. unlike the historic perspective what people often need to
understand in order to understand the north korean issue from the strategic perspective is the fact that we are dealing with a nuclear capability. the pursuit of the wmd capabilities in the nuclear and missile programs that track that as you mentioned back to the 1980's actually you could say the 1960's when north korea first centered the nuclear field clearly by the mid 1980's onward north korea had made a decision that the peak of the cold war some degree able to survive based on the large estimate of moscow of beijing playing off the soviet conflict but in the case in the middle of the cold war largely protected by security treaties and alliances with both those countries not to reproduce capability intended to give that a degree of independence and a degree of
self determination and ability to call the shots and to mitigate any external pressure on the state to change and reform and into this capability of course the cold war at the beginning of the 1990's which raises even more exponentially the value and criticality of the capability of the survival of the regime. in spite of the agreed framework which it entered into in 1994 with the united states which successfully brought to an end of the production of five leased plutonium as one of the critical fissile elements of the program, throughout the whole period we continued to see a refinement of its capabilities, high explosive testing taking place in order to perfect the design of a weapon continued pursuit of its missile capabilities bruce spoke of the short-range ballistic missiles and the other as we know which
is the headline grabber, it is long-range ballistic missiles of these capabilities continue to be developed during what is arguably the golden years of the dprk u.s. relations often referred to as the agreed framework and what people often don't remember is we look at the events as they unfolded with a 2000 is that during these golden years, during the final years of the clinton administration when you had the advent of the sunshine policy under -- the visit of the number two man in north korea to washington was secretary albright visiting pyongyang, a visit i was fortunate to be on. during these very year's number three already embarked on an alternative path to fissile materials with its highly enriched uranium from and north korea had already started
cooperation with syria to support the production at elkus bar. during the cooperation when you could say the u.s. did not have its hostile policy. when we didn't have an administration that was not hesitant to use terms like axes of evil and other derogatory terms, even during those years, north korea demonstrated its strategic intent to pursue this nuclear capability. in the 2000's you had the public break out. the october, 2002, confrontation of north korea and its highly enriched uranium from by the assistant secretary jim kelly in the state department it really is a point of demarcation where north korea initially confirms the existence of the program, and a possible decision hastily
made overnight at mr. secretary kelly the have the program and shortly overturns this is a decision and decides to pursue the plutonium break out, so in 2003 we see the first three processing campaigns where north korea ads another couple of weapons worth of the plutonium to its arsenal in 2005 another reprocessing campaign you have this breakout where the intermingled with the dialogue, intermingled with the negotiating process the starts out with the three party talks and moves ultimately into six-party talks. even during this period, this negotiation when all the time is taken to improve technical capabilities, and then these breakouts of nuclear tests and missile launches to demonstrate these capabilities will. let me read briefly from the dni
assessment that bruce mentioned earlier which won't quote the conventional capabilities obviously for good reason. the north, october 2006 nuclear test was consistent with our long standing assessment that it produced the nuclear device. although we at test the judge at the status of to be partial fill your based on its list than 1 kiloton equivalent yield. the north probable nuclear test of may come to those in line support its claim that it has been seeking to develop weapons with a yield of roughly a few caltrans was apparently more successful in 2006. we judge north korea has tested to decisis and while we do not know north korea has produced nuclear weapons we assess it has the capability to do so. it remains our policy that we will not accept north korea as a nuclear weapon state. after denying a highly enriched uranium programs since 2003, north korea announced in april, 2000 and that is developing
uranium enrichment capability to produce fuel for a plan of light water reactor such reactor is used in the enriched uranium and as we see in the iran context you have a capability ostensibly for commercial capabilities but also proves the capabilities weapons application when taken to the highly enriched uranium level. in september to the semi north korea claimed it's a in richmond phase and the attempt of these announcements isn't clear, but the intelligence community continues to assess with the high confidence north korea pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past which we assess for weapons. we judge he seeks recognition in north korea as a power by the united states in the international community. pyongyang into and in pursuing dialogue at this time is to take it vantage of what it perceives as an enhanced negotiating position. having demonstrated its nuclear
and missile capabilities. 2009 was truly a pivotal year as an analyst who followed in the north korean nuclear issue largely since it began to unfold. a lot of the critical questions we have, for a sample, was this simply a capability the was being developed as a negotiating card? was this a capability the ultimately north korea knew that it would have to give up to pursue the economic recovery and development that everybody surely in pyongyang must know they need, or was this a capability north korea intended to develop and keep? as a new administration interoffice with a demonstrated willingness to reach out and hand to those countries that would on clenched fists, north korea responded clipper quickly to president obama and sell reach and with a series of steps that mall only to find a strategic intent but also
designed to set the tone for the alana administration. three days before the inauguration of president obama, the dprk foreign ministry spokesman issued a statement that made these issues quite clear. and his best to use pyongyang's own words to understand the intent. the u.s. -- the statement said -- is miscalculating if it considers a normalization of the dprk u.s. relations as a reward for the dprk's nuclear abandonment. the dprk has made the nuclear weapons to defend itself from a north korean nuclear threat, not the anticipation of such things as a normalization of things with assistance. it is a real live in the korean peninsula but that we can live, although at a very low rate editorial comment, we can live without normalize its relations with the u.s. but we cannot live without our nuclear deterrent. we've lived for decades of
normalizing relations with the u.s. and we live on still with dignity. if there is anything we desire it is not to normalize relations between the dprk and the u.s., but to boost our nuclear deterrent in every way to more firmly defend the security of our nation. that is what we have witnessed in 2009. not as khator steps perce, not provocations perce although we could argue they are provocative in fact in the launch which rather in a satellite launch demonstrates the same capabilities that apply to the system north korea checked the box is like a sovereign state we have a sovereign right in spite of the united nations security council resolution, 1718 which states all missile activities are prohibited, north korea's as we are a sovereign state, you launch the satellites, we launch the satellites and one month
later conducted the second nuclear test. as it declared a nuclear state, you declare -- you test your nuclear weapons we test our nuclear weapons. so 2009 largely ended a lot of the analytical debate i think even by many of those people who otherwise were optimistic. i will not call them apologists but otherwise we would be optimistic about the potentiality for some type of denuclearization under the september 2005 statement with north korea. clearly kim jong il through these steps and then through the subsequent steps following the united nations security council resolution 1874 and the sanctions that we placed on north korea has clearly stated that it rejects the legitimacy of the united nations security council resolutions. it rejects the legitimacy of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a monopoly of the superpowers
for justifying their capabilities while denying countries such as number three of the right to there's. it has reportedly did the september 2005 statement as referring to the denuclearization of the korean peninsula and has reintegrated the commitment to the denuclearization of the world. on the one hand, encouraging statements, like world peace. you can be against world peace. on the other hand, it clearly demonstrates north korea's position that we will denuclearize when you, the united states, when you, china, one of the world powers denuclearized, when the united states finally does something about israel, when india and pakistan get rid of their nuclear weapons. this is north korea's clearly articulated position. but is the position sustainable? of that is the question and that is what makes 2010 a definitive
year for the world. if it was the year for pyongyang to meet its steegmans, 2010 is the key year for of a nuclear north korea. kathryn touched briefly on the domestic context and that is where we need to focus. we assisted kim jong il having had a stroke in august of 2008, a diminished physical capability has more or less recovered after initial rush to move fourth with a succession process by designating his third son as a successor in some activities that appear to demonstrate an expedited process with him having questions about his mortality. since then his recovery has not overturned the decision for kim jong il to take power but clearly has slowed down the process. now, as you have a succession process, nevertheless it is being carried out at a faster pace when he took over from, you
have a lot of room for discontent, uncertainties, clarity's and perhaps even something we have not seen traditionally and until north korea policy debate. it is a very dire situation that the succession process is unfolding under. you have every year north korea fails to meet its domestic population food requirements by roughly 20% amid differ take five or six millennia year nessus' to become formally produced. every year 20% short of feeding the people. in a system that depends upon the state being able to monopolize the production and distribution to its public distribution system maintain loyalty to maintain control the state not able to feed its people is not a highly sustainable model. less than one-quarter of its
industry functions, and we can speak on and on about the fuel shortages, the basic supply shortages, even the difficulties of exploiting the one thing that north korea is known to have which is mineral resources because the completely broken down infrastructure. there is no way of going in and extracting the resources. rampant inflation resulting from the currency revaluation demonstrates a degree of desperate miss on the number three as part to try to do something to rein in all of the capitalist activities to the entrepreneurial activity that has begun to unfold in north korea but also demonstrate the state's inability to bring it under control. in fact as we read and the story is still out on the whole impact of this currency revaluation what is becoming clearer are two things, the state can't bring buddy, and under its control. it is just no way.
the economy would become too monetized coping mechanisms that allowed north korea to survive since the famine years of the mid-1990s and onward for the local farmers using the household plots selling those on the markets. when you do an action like currency revaluation you cut off all of the entrepreneurial activity at the knees, and also in the near term north korea may be successful in containing this, the long-term implications particularly again of the elite and their confidence not so much kim jong il fighting kim jong il has established a degree of legitimacy based on his pursuit of a nuclear program. if you look at the propaganda, the propaganda throughout the whole 1990's and certainly in 2000 were based on we know we have to sacrifice. we know that we will not have all of the necessities we need. we know that will not be an
economic superpower but it's not being an economic superpower that will prevent us from the scenario that will prevent us from the fate of the socialist bloc countries. it will be a military capability most manifested in evidence in that nuclear capability. that degree of legitimacy at least with kim jong il has coupled with a very strong security and intelligence apparatus that continues to have a very effective mechanism. in any case people have been willing to suffer through the arduous march and live with these circumstances under kim jong il. the question is whether that legitimacy, that type of sustainability of the regime in these economically donner conditions is transferable to kim jong il or any other successor. but most importantly, and this is where the hope if there is
any, and i do have to believe that there is, for north korea to come to the same calculation, the same strategic calculation about its nuclear weapons capability that omar khaddafi did in libya, south africa did in a abandoning its people become for north korea to come to the same strategic calculus, they're has to be a revaluation of priorities on the elite. they have to see that ultimately this is a matter of a trade-off that they can have their cake and eat it, too. they cannot remain a power that is not denuclearized and gain acceptance into the international community to gain the full acceptance of support to for the republic of korea and the degree of normalization relations with united states mrs. reed to gain that international credibility to
restore its financial image etc. let me close briefly than by looking at the north korea issue within three contexts to kind of see what the home work is. what can we do about north korea? what are the options that we may face, the united states and the six-party talks partners? within three broad context first book peninsula context and more regional context and then third what the international context with an emphasis on proliferation. the earlier animated debate on the conventional capability barry much mirrors it takes place within your behind the green door and have access to all of the secrets or whether you don't this is a very robust debate but i think if we agree that it is not just nuclear weapons but the entirety of the asymmetrical capabilities, the
ability to inflict damage upon seóul in on conventional ways long-range artillery deployed forward in a way that in essence is a terror weapon by its ability to threaten seóul and unleash shalls on populations at any moment. the special operations forces, the chemical, bio weapons all provide a capability to unleash incredible damage on our allies and the republic of korea. in the zeros some competition for legitimacy remains in spite of the fact both korea have entered the united nations i notice they will enter the olympics might under different flags for the first time in about two or three olympics. it still is a zero sum game and bruce was well to point out that north korea hasn't abandoned its
goal of having the capability to affect the unification process in a way favorable. i use that language deliberately because i think it may be kind anachronism to say that north korea still has as its goal a unifying the peninsula to force that implies capabilities to come all the way down south and occupy the peninsula. i think larry spoke to the difficulties of that but they certainly want a military capabilities asymmetrical conventional, on conventional that allows to determine the end of the out game however the game might plea of. there is uncertainty associated with the process that makes it highly unstable, and in that case dave mentioned the collapse scenario and how we prepare for that. and in this regard i think the key to the peninsula context across the board with the conventional threat associated with traditional plan of 5720
invasion of the south or 5029 scenario collapse of the north. the key to this is close cooperation and allianz management between the united states and the republic of korea and in this regard i would have to say from an analytical perspective we are on some of the most solid ground we have been in a good number of years. we look at the cooperation and look toward a nation that takes place between seoul and washington both within the six-party talks context and in the bilateral context. the key to deter north korea's adventuresome of course is a strong blue house and engaged committed white house and i would say again if i can hold that for my own position and look at this objectively i think if anybody looks at this objectively we are at a very good pogo in iraq u.s. relations. the regional context is the
newly emerging threat. for years we look to the peninsula obviously the war on the peninsula would have been regional the destabilizing but clearly north korea's chief of development of a nuclear capability together with the short-range ballistic missiles to intermediate ballistic missiles and of course the potential icbm mix north korea very destabilizing from a regional perspective. that is one of the earlier presentation by heritage was key as well because it's the to the capabilities of the ballistic missile defense brings to the united states and our own defense as well as partnership with japan and other countries in deploying these capabilities. the ballistic missile threat but ultimately the key is diplomacy and how the united states is able to cooperate with the other six party partners particularly the people's republic of china and its role in the six-party
talks process, the country with a historic relationship with the dprk, the country with a demonstrated commitment to seeking a non-nuclear korean peninsula and a country that is critical to work with in the future, and secondly it is clearly as importantly relationship with japan, and i think here again in spite of some difficulties with the transaction of governments on both sides and anytime you have a transition you have a period of getting to know each other on this issue, on the north korean nuclear issue has been a solid partnerships throughout the whole period of the six-party talks. japan has its own critical interests in relation to the issue. i think it has been a faithful partner in the six-party talks and has clearly shown as much
concern as the target perhaps even more so than other countries in the region because the ballistic missile capabilities but the real target of the north capability as my japanese colleagues like to remind me a missile with a nuclear warhead is really the most serious and real threat we face from a nuclear north korea. and that is not only the taepodong threat. and north korea wanted to break the alliance as a goal of getting u.s. forces of the peninsula they certainly would like u.s. forces out of japan to get pyongyang's constant goal has been to drive a wedge between washington and seoul on the one hand washington and
tokyo on the other and certainly any trilateral cooperation between the countries, and in this regard again, not to throw optimism where optimism isn't due but clearly we have a strong trilateral cooperative relationship on this issue. finally let me go let me move on to the international context because people are correct in pointing to the proliferations concern as real. north korea demonstrated a willingness and the capability to proliferate nuclear technology and it's important to syria and its construction of the rea dirt to how the war. its history of exporting will stick missiles to iran, syria and other countries. it's long roster of activities, counterfeiting of the u.s. currency from international narcotrafficking.
it's clear north korea place by a difference in the international norms of behavior than other countries do and while we want to provide for north korea and opportunity to normalize its behavior and opportunity to pursue a path that doesn't require the proliferation of these types of weapons, these types of arms, these types of illicit activities, and while we continue to pursue that within the six-party talks context, as we keep for north korea all the benefits it would have by pursuing the road it has yet demonstrated unwillingness take over denuclearization. in addition to all of those benefits we have a very strong set of monitoring sanctions right now that have proven successful as we have seen in the turn of the boat which was headed to south asia the detention of their plant in
thailand that was headed to the middle east. we've seen it samples where the united nations security council resolution 1874 print please with close cooperation with the six-party talks partners with russia and china where putting the sanctions in to the police have had an affect of deterring the likelihood of not only conventional arms proliferation, not only making it more difficult to prove with trade ballistic missiles, but helping ensure our capabilities and make it that much more difficult for the sum of all fears scenario that is the number three of the wood to a desperate act which would be certainly an act of desperation i think even with treen as the cost of this of proliferation beyond what has done to date. and this is life in this regard within the international context the sanctions put in place on
these companies that are associated with north korea's weapons of mass destruction program, the companies in the so-called second economy coming your omnocons and companies that sell for entry lot of people here, these are the companies selling the missiles they are attempting to sell the arms and likely would be the ones the would sell even beyond that. and it's better that we cooperate internationally the greater likelihood we have of reducing the type of proliferation which obviously would be unacceptable. in summary we've seen in north korea of lead, we could reiterate its commitment to the multilateral dialogue toward the denuclearization carefully chosen words, a bit of assistance to return to the six-party talks which it had
probably seen consensus that grew into those in line among the other parties of an intolerance of the nuclear north korea and unwillingness to give in to their traditional negotiating behavior to his of the commitment to the multilateral dialogue towards the denuclearization and a broad sense however. denuclearization of the peninsula. removal of the nuclear umbrella from the republic of korea, removal of real and imagined threats in reality. it's a difficult road ahead but it's good north korea continues to be articulate its commitment to the articulation. we need to build upon that in order to help lead north korea down the road leads to head. unfortunately there isn't appeared to be a strategic decision by pyongyang however at
this point and that is why the intelligence community as reflected in director blair's comments doesn't place a high probability that kim jong il will give up his nuclear weapons which he personally sees as crucial to his security. and that's why we move on to the third point which is why we need strategic patients. strategic patience is the key to reach out to the elite. strategic patients engagement a reiteration of our commitment to the six-party talks partners' commitment to number one move north korea towards the road of denuclearization of also to show where all the benefits that can have by that denuclearization. kathryn, i think you're right, you've got an elite that many of them have lived overseas return to pyongyang.
they are younger. information penetration of north korea is greater than it's ever been in history. they know what the outside is like. they all know the potential benefits of the denuclearization. kim jong il i believe has made the decision that the nuclear weapons are more beneficial than all of its potential benefits and it's hard to argue with somebody like that. you've got the same situation to the degree between japan and north korea with all this potential assistance to readers progress on the issues and yet they refuse to do even that. how much harder would be for them to give of their nuclear weapons particularly kim jong il for the economic promises. but the next generation may be different and that is what we look to. that is what we follow closely and that in itself is why we
have to continue to articulate to north korea of our intolerance of its nuclear capabilities as well as the benefits that it would gain should it choose the right of the denuclearization. now i will wrap up their and open for questions and comments. >> thank you very much. one by one. okay claudia, you raised your hand first. clotting. would you please come up here. we have several microphones here. i believe they are -- you can just turn on. sure. very for all. on c-span, push the button. yes. >> [inaudible] -- was the only boy joint
venture [inaudible] >> there's absolutely no reason to think that north korea having crossed the line wouldn't do it again as course -- >> [inaudible] >> possible signs. >> we watch these activities on a global scale and obviously i think everybody in this room knows a lot of the stuff that is in the media, possible potential cooperation with burma and other countries. the difficulty with north korea of course is it is a fascinating topic given all the amount of disinformation and speak to that of reporting that's all there it's really difficult to sort through the full array of information and disinformation that's available and i am not meaning to outright discount all of that information because clearly what we are seeing the thing is unprecedented for you of third country open source invitation it was mentioned
earlier. other countries reporting -- i just assure you because of this precedent we watch very closely. >> just to follow up on a quick follow-up on that. could you name, understanding that you are not going to make spectacular news this afternoon by telling us you actually spotted one summer else but could you name five places that bear closer looking? you know about burma that north korea is extremely busy in many parts of the world. we just heard larry niksch tallest the bush administration never came clean about their guerini in connection. i personally have wondered because there's all sorts of evidence that there was brokering going on between syria and north korea and iraq over syria at the same time the reactor was being built. so could you take us further afield from a latin america,
africa, elsewhere in southeast asia, some places where you keep an eye even if you are not seeing anything yet. >> not in an effort to dodge the question, but to artfully dodge -- you know, there are two dimensions to and issues such as this. first is to forget the third countries' intentions. what type of countries would be willing to pursue this capability? one distinguishing mark about north korea's wmd experts particularly the dismissals is it is countries that can't acquire police anywhere else that turn to north korea. north korea is not the provider of preference if you are a legitimate country looking to build a decent system or this is not diminished some of the quality of their exports, but when you were dealing with north korea, you are risking the
isolation, you are making a strategic and that meant you are willing to be labeled the paray of that comes with dealing with north korea. so we look at those countries that would be like that and we do also follow closely where north korea, and the jewels are troubling enough businesses. i would also say those in another reason why i definitely don't want to speak too much on this question is our ultimate success in detecting this is ultimately based upon an ability to track this without a large amount of attention coming to. i think clearly with the syria case, and i know i will probably take a large number of zeros for this one but on the syria case it was an intelligence success story of how we identify get and how we worked through that issue and i will leave it at that but
it is an issue that we are extremely focused on within the larger context of any probe state wanting to pursue either the plutonium route within all the bar reactor oracle for uranium enrichment programs. >> thank you. very artful. gordon? >> we heard a fascinating discussion about the capabilities and frailty of the north korean military. but of course when we talk about this shouldn't we also talk about the north koreans friends? for instance, north korea and china are each other's only military ally. china is north korea's primary diplomatic backer and certainly provides a lot of material assistance. i know that sounds inconceivable the people's liberation army but held the north koreans, but of course in the last couple of weeks we have seen these statements by chinese generals in the age of media about taking
on the united states as willing to fight and even prepare for it. so i guess the question is can somebody on the panel talk about how the people's liberation army might interact and help the korean people's army after all this is something that has happened before in the 1950's and so it would seem to me that this would be an important part of the discussion in terms of thinking about conflict on the korean peninsula. >> thank you, gordon. anyone else? >> i would say from an intelligence committee perspective or actually when you look at china first of all but squier china isn't a monolith if you scour the open source writings and various voices out there i think you get a diversity of opinion but what is clear is that beijing and washington have an important relationship and that one would
find it difficult -- and the prc has led the six-party talks process to legacy the commitment to maintain stability in the region. both by pursuing the difficult task of the denuclearization and also dealing with north korea that times to throw temper tantrums and make everybody's life difficult. in that regard would be difficult for me to conceive of any type of cooperation between the two countries the was designed either to destabilize the region or shift the balance of power on the peninsula. >> you have a followup, gordon? >> all right, mike.
>> [inaudible] first, i'm not a military specialist. i work on the affairs of the commerce the part of commesso for professor behtol, an dittman that irg ze refers to the iranian revolutionary guard. second, for both professor bechtol and syd, what impact has had on the north korea's position on its nuclear program? because it seems to have pretty dramatic effect on the arms trade trafficking, and last for syd you mentioned succession and i was at a wilson center even a couple weeks ago on curry and there was a lot of discussion about which regime to negotiate with or you know, which would be
more effective to negotiate with the current one, the kim jong il regime or the successor regime and i would like to get your thoughts on that. thanks. >> thank you, mike. but bruce take that first and then syd. >> command control computers, communications and intelligence. how am i doing? that is the sea for life. if you really want to complicate things like the military commanders like to, usually on the advice of guys like dave used early in the audience our command, control, computers come intelligence -- >> [inaudible] >> right. essentially what it means is let's go back to before we had the modern communications. the reason -- i live in fredericksburg virginia the cultural center of the universe,
about 10 kilometers from my home in the county is chancellorsville where he defeated an army twice his size. he was able to do so because he was able to control his troops better than the union commander was, and that hasn't changed. he or she was able to control their troops the best, move them the quickest to the most effective spot has the best c4i and in today's technology c4i has become the aspect of winning the war not shorter in duration lummis you are counting counterinsurgency. does that make sense? i didn't articulate very well. i saw this world peace, syd might have seen this contract, from a think-tank in stockholm ten days ago that said the weapon sales for north korea had gone down by 90%. please allow me to say i doubt
that. i think the two things come 1874 is very important. that is what you're asking about and i think that psi is very important as well because we are never going to stop but we can certainly hurt them. i think you've seen that 1824 has done something i think is very important and we have gotten nation's, we haven't traditionally played a big role in things like the psi or the united arab 35 tons of military equipment is a lot to lose. so i think it has has some of fact. i have no idea how much effect but it's certainly at the very least force to the north koreans to look at using the new tactics, techniques and procedures when they run these types of programs and something that is fascinating to me as i am sure you've been reading the press about what happened at
thailand, how the shipment was supposed to go from north korea to thailand, sri lanka to somewhere else eventually to torian they were using front companies in five different come trees to discuss the six countries. it boggles the mind. the plane built by the russians, ansar, georgia. very interesting stuff. the north koreans are very smart at doing this stuff. so we are going to -- obra government and folks like syd he works with have to continue to be very smart to come out how they run these operations because they're very sophisticated. >> [inaudible] >> part and me? >> is it impacting korea's nuclear position? >> i think that larry can answer that one. >> larry? >> you talked about whether it would be more difficult or less difficult between negotiating with kim jong il and negotiating
with a successor regime. it seems to me the position that north korean government has laid out in the last few months including what syd talked about, this denigration of the importance of diplomatic relations also the revival of the peace treaty agenda, the attempt to roll the nuclear issue and to a peace treaty negotiation rather than a sixth party negotiating, demand that sanctions be lifted, we saw the development of some of these positions actually early in 2009, january and february. there were a number of important north korea policy statements related to their negotiating
positions. it began to leave these things out. now, that was the period when kim jong il seemed to have been incapacitated because of his stroke period from september until probably april or may of this year. and we had in effect a collective body of leaders now taking over at least part if not all of the policy formulation process during the period. these policies which have been -- which continue to have been built up and do the book and have been laid out to the obama administration now seems to be a case in which the north korean government now with kim jong il
apparently back in charge of the policy formulation process has carried over the agenda that the what you might call successor collective leadership began to put forth early 2009. that tells me that the influence and power that these leaders and one expression that has been described to group has been for generals, now there may be a few more officials added to the group of five that have been described to. it seems to me that even though kim jong il seems to be back in charge of the policy formulation
process the power that this group accumulated during this seven or eight month period in which they were running the policy formulation process their power has not reseated all that much and he has to listen to them now more than he did perhaps before the pre-stroke period, and again i think the negotiating agenda on the nuclear issue that they are laying out which is a very difficult one especially the peace agreement i think reflects the influence of the group and influence which i think remains at a high level. >> thank you. mike? >> michael marshall. i must of rolls-royce for
getting here rather late. i simply couldn't get away before. a question but a couple of observations first by the publishers for being late again. these are my observations. it seems to me that the internal situation of north korea is extremely volatile at the present and a lot of the policies we see are an effort to keep a lid on that volatility. as mr. seiler mentioned, north korea is much more open to information from the other side than it was under kim l. sung and people know that south korea as much better off than north korea. they know that china, people went into china during the famine in the late nineties and saw that the life there was better than north korea so there is an awareness that north korea is not what people were told it was in the past.
and i think that is then reflected not so much in the popular -- yes, popular attitudes. not a political process movement, but in people's attitude toward the country and work. some years ago i spoke to a mollyann senior legislator ogle leah has a fairly open relations with north korea as well as close to the u.s., which is very useful and he said that he also was a private businessman and he implied north korean laborers. they come to mongolia and get work there. and he said these people have no work ethic. they simply are -- they don't understand what it is to turn up on time to work hard to read he said after about a year in mongolia they start to catch on. and i've heard similar things from the members of the south korean unification ministry
about the north korean workers in the complex that people do not have anything like the worst and thick to the acoustics work ethic and what it reminded me of is the eastern workers under the soviet union where people said we pretend to work and they pretend to pay. in the level of the population, the working population there's clearly extensive demoralization when it comes to the elite interest, mr. seiler is, who stands where among the elite is not a monolithic body. if there is probably mostly a younger generation who are looking to the future and realizing that the present situation is not sustainable. and perhaps an older generation particularly of the military leaders who want to hold on to the legacy of kim ill sung and
protected and the nuclear capability is a sort of assurance of that. but just to wind up my mongolian legislator said that he and the legislature frequently receives parties officials from north korea and he said one of the first questions they asked in a private conversation is what happened to your communist party? what happened to the members of the mongolian communist party? you know, did they get shot, or they put in prison? no the continued in the political process and got elected back into the government at one stage in the post communist history so there is clearly concerned among officials that the sort of mid level of what is the future going to be like we for sea ch